Who is Responsible?

ARMAGEDDON AND AFTER!

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CLOUDESLEY BRERETON

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
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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

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ARMAGEDDON AND AFTER!

BY

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON

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"STUDIES IN FOREIGN EDUCATION," ETC.

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

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PREFACE

THIS little book attempts to trace out how Prussian tradition, starting with Frederick the Great, has succeeded in corrupting the Germany of to-day. At the same time, due credit is given to the collateral policy of increasing the nation's efficiency, even if the final product has been a type of organization that approximates to the orderly servitude of the beehive.

The author has attempted an analysis of the character of the Kaiser. William's love of the spectacular is emphasized, and he is described as the Nero in vanity, if not in cruelty, of the twentieth century.

The workings of the Mailed Fist are next discussed, and the final results of his twenty-five years of forcible-feeble diplomacy are summed up as having left Germany without a friend in the world and as having reconciled with one another many nations who hitherto had not been on friendly terms. A sketch is

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also given of that "hotch-potch" of nations, Austria-Hungary, and its racial problems.

The succeeding chapter deals with the colossal strength and efficiency of Germany and its corresponding weaknesses. It shows how the vast mass of the nation lies tied and bound in the toils of the most scientific bureaucracy in the world. Free speech and free criticism are well-nigh impossible, especially with a Kaiser who acts as an imperial gramophone on every conceivable topic, with a reptile Press more or less in the pay of the State, and with the intellectual *élite* of the country little better than an academic garrison at the beck and call of the Government. Even the schools are schools of Chauvinism. The masses are infected with the same virus. Spiritual Germany lies buried under the weight of Prussian materialism. Germany is a science-ridden State. As a logical result, we have the monstrous doctrine that German civilization is not only the best, but that it is Germany's duty to impose it everywhere. The Germans are the chosen people of the twentieth century. Hence one law for the Germans and another for the other nations—or, in other words, a total disregard for international law, as

instanced by the destruction of Louvain and the other atrocities in Belgium.

Another chapter deals with our allies, the Russians and the French, and emphasizes our duty in the present struggle to strive for a righteous and lasting peace, taking for our battle-cries "*A fight to a finish*" and "*Never again.*" An indication is also given of what life in England would be like under German rule.

The last chapter forecasts what form the final settlement should take. It should be based on the principle of nationality. No more Alsace-Lorraines should be permitted in Europe; Germany and Austria should be reduced to their natural limits. Peace may possibly be made separately with the other States and Prussia thus isolated, but all must pay their share of the cost of the war. Oppressed nationalities should be freed or revived, *armaments must be drastically reduced.* We have had enough of the terrors of armed peace. Hitherto the relations of nations to one another have been far too much those of brute beasts. We must develop an international conscience between the peoples of Europe.

Peace societies have, unfortunately, neg-

lected too much Internationalism, or the brotherhood of nations, and concentrated unduly on Cosmopolitanism, or the brotherhood of man. Yet Internationalism is, or ought to be, the logical outcome of the Liberal principle of nationality. All this involves the creation of a far stronger Hague Tribunal, a veritable Holy Alliance, but this time on democratic not autocratic lines. One hopes that in time such a tribunal will become the Delphic oracle of Europe. Such a tribunal is our only means of escape from the vicious circle of the balance of power, whereby the top dog of Europe has to be pulled down periodically by the rest of the pack.

It is to the *women* that we look in the future as one of the great forces making for peace. Germany is a standing warning of the dangers of a too exclusively man-made civilization. At the outset, we are fighting to protect the French coasts and to uphold the neutrality of Belgium. But the real issues at stake are national existence, liberty, democracy, international law, and the creation of an International Court of Appeal for the united or allied States of Europe.

In its deepest aspect the struggle is really

one between the science and art of things and the science and art of life, between science in a narrow sense and religion in a broad one. German civilization is the last word of the mechanistic ideal. We are fighting to determine whether one civilization shall prevail over the rest or whether the next step forward shall not be a federation of civilizations, possibly a reunion of Western and Eastern thought; and in this respect the participation of Indian troops is of the greatest significance.

This is probably one of the great turning-points in the world's history—and the issue may be a great spiritual Renaissance or the return of the Huns.

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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

CHAPTER I

THE MAILED FIST

I

THE BEGINNING OF REALPOLITIK

We are engaged in a Titanic struggle, greater even than the war our ancestors waged against Napoleon, great as that war undoubtedly was. We are probably in for a time that will try our national fortitude and national temper to the uttermost. We are faced with the possible expenditure of tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of money. There may be in store for us, as Mr. Churchill has hinted, many reverses in the field, great destitution at home, possibly even famine. And yet in our darkest hour one is certain

that our resolution to fight on will only deepen in its intensity. In the great world-drama in which we are called to-day to play our part the *rôle* for which we have been cast is none of our seeking. Even those of us who felt that the summer lightning in the Balkans was but the prelude of a European tempest have on the broad grounds of humanity and civilization hoped against hope that the chapter of accidents might somehow intervene and prevent the inevitable *dénouement.*

If ever a quarrel were thrust upon a nation, such is the quarrel in which we are engaged to-day. If ever a war were not only just but inevitable, such is the present war. The Areopagus of neutral nations who are the trustees of the world's conscience are already pronouncing with no uncertain voice in our favour. They see with increasing clearness that the real cause is not whether or no certain Serbians assassinated one who was the embodied enemy of their race. They realize that the war has not suddenly dropped from the clouds because of an inconvenient desire of the Belgians to remain a free State. This war is the logical and inscrutable outcome and conclusion of a policy which to-day

bears the title of *Realpolitik*, and which first Prussia and then Germany has been carrying on with intervals for over two hundred years. It is based on the principles that as far as foreign nations are concerned might is right, the end justifies the means and all is fair in war and diplomacy. Its success up to a certain point has ended by convincing those who practise it that they are, indeed, nothing less than a chosen people and their sovereign is the Lord's Anointed.

But the policy of "force and fraud" abroad —which has also been practised by other nations, though scarcely so strenuously as by Prussia and Prussianized Germany— would not have achieved the success it has if it had not been backed up at home with an equally consistent policy of strengthening the nation, first Prussia and then Germany, by wise domestic administration and social reform. If we go back no further in Prussian history than the reign of Frederick the Great (1740–1786), we find this dual policy of land-grabbing abroad and land improvement at home in full operation.

Thus, to the existing dominions of Brandenburg and Pomerania, which formed the original possessions of the Hohenzollern

dynasty, together with East Prussia and other inconsiderable trifles, he added Silesia and East Friesland in 1744–45, wresting the former from Austria and taking over the latter on the death of the last reigning prince. It is interesting to note that Emden, the German naval port nearest to our shores, is situated in Frisian territory. Again, in 1772, he participated with Austria and Russia in the first partition of the independent kingdom of Poland, his share being what is now known as West Prussia. Since this was inhabited by a population mainly Teutonic, there was more justification for his act than for that of his fellow-robbers. Still there is no doubt whatever about the policy Frederick persistently followed. He himself, with his usual brutal frankness, said: "I begin by taking. I can always find pedants to justify my rights afterwards." As regards the internal administration of his country, he reformed the coinage and the legal code, patronized letters, effected vast land reclamations, and encouraged colonists from every quarter. This strong admixture of foreign blood may account to some extent for the fact that the Prussians are in some ways the least typical of the Germans. As his own

Chancellor, he had a finger in every pie—an example which his present successor apparently does his best to copy. Prussia under Frederick both externally and internally may be regarded as the triumph of a machine-made State.

The same dual policy was continued at home and abroad by the majority of his successors. Prussia shared with her former partners in the receipt of stolen goods in the second and third partition of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Certain changes and rearrangements took place in 1807, but the net result was to incorporate in Prussia the province of Posen, so that to-day the population of Germany comprises no less than 10 per cent. of Poles—whom, by the way, she has so far failed to assimilate.

Then, in 1815, Prussia acquired the country known as Prussian Saxony, the Rhine provinces, and Westphalia. In 1834, she started the famous *Zollverein*, the effects of which in securing the unification of Germany cannot be exaggerated. Germany was at the time a sort of jig-saw puzzle of States, and even Prussia consisted of various detached portions; the result was that the whole country was covered with a network of toll-bars.

By establishing first comparative and finally complete free trade within the Verein, which was gradually joined by the various States, Prussia succeeded in drawing the great majority of them into her orbit and sphere of influence, though some, like Hamburg and Bremen, only came in after 1880. Not only was the unification of Germany in 1870 immensely facilitated by the Zollverein, but a tradition of active co-operation between the business world and the Government has been built up which has been of immense value to German commerce (*vide* State subsidies to shipping and the help afforded by German consuls abroad, who have acted in many cases as veritable official commercial travellers).

At the beginning of the sixties it would seem that another policy than Realpolitik might have prevailed. The Liberals were in power in Prussia; but the King of the day, William, afterwards the German Emperor, was a firm believer in the mission of Prussia to secure the unification of Germany, as well as in the divine right of kings, and, aided by such men of genius as Von Roon (Minister of War), Bismarck, and Moltke, the policy of Frederick the Great won the day. Prus-

sia again enlarged her boundaries. In 1866, she definitely annexed the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, which, in spite of their long union with Denmark, extending over two hundred years, had been wrested from that country by Prussia and Austria some years before. It should be noted that Holstein, through which runs the celebrated Kiel Canal, is in the main German. North Schleswig, however, is Danish and still returns a Danish member to the Reichstag. Meanwhile Austria had been given notice to clear out of Germany after the battle of Sadowa in the same year. Her statesmen were told to take as their motto *Der Drang nach Osten* (The Push Eastward). Budapest was to be her centre of gravity, as Bismarck had formerly said, and she was to seek compensation for being excluded from Germany by conquering what Slav countries she could. Prussia annexed a certain number of North German States that had taken the Austrian side, notably the kingdom of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort. The greater part of the fortune of the King of Hanover was confiscated, and the yearly income (*Welfenfonds*) was until 1890 used for the purpose

of "controlling" the Press in the Government interest.

In 1870, a quarrel was picked with France. It is possible, of course, that France might ultimately have picked a quarrel with Germany, but the fact remains that the immediate cause of the war was a perfectly innocent telegram from the King of Prussia, describing an interview with the French Ambassador, edited in such a way as to make it appear that Germany had been insulted. The results of the war are well known. Germany annexed Alsace and a good part of Lorraine —the latter for strategic reasons on the advice of Moltke, although the inhabitants were French. German was still the native tongue of Alsace, though French was widely spoken and understood.

The Franco-German War chiefly led to the definite consolidation of Germany under the King of Prussia, who took the title of Kaiser Wilhelm I., and the dream of Bismarck to weld together the country by blood and iron was accomplished. Within Germany itself there followed a great increase in wealth, commerce, and industry. There was a splendid development of the coal and iron basin in Westphalia, partially fostered by the pro-

ceeds of the French indemnity. The Government also promoted numerous useful social reforms—legal, commercial, financial, etc.—including the well-known State insurance against sickness and unemployment.

After 1870, Germany became a world-Power, and the same policy of Realpolitik which had formerly played such a part on the domestic stage was now applied to the solution of world problems. Its total lack of morality was shown in 1876, when Bismarck proposed to attack France, her only fault being that she had rapidly recovered from a state of prostration he had fondly imagined would last for years. France was saved by the intervention of Queen Victoria, with the aid of the Emperor of Russia, who gave the Germans to understand that if France was attacked he would be obliged to come to her defence; and finally the Emperor William told Moltke that he felt too old to have another war on his conscience.

To take the attention of the French off Europe, and especially off Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck strongly encouraged their statesmen to embark on a vigorous colonial policy. He no doubt also hoped it might embroil them with other European Powers, and this

actually happened in 1881, when France proclaimed a protectorate over Tunis—a country which, as it is only a hundred and twenty miles from Italian territory, the Italians had always coveted as their own. The result was to throw Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria, which led to the creation of the Triple Alliance. Bismarck was at first opposed to a German colonial policy through fear of weakening Germany in Europe; so that when Germany finally embarked on such a policy, she came very late into the field and found herself everywhere anticipated or hampered. Thus, after years of carefully sending colonists to the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul, where the colonists formed veritable German communities, the Brazilians naturally took fright and informed the United States. The latter were no less alarmed at the idea of Germany acquiring possessions on the American continent, which seemed to infringe the Monroe Doctrine, and this was one of the most potent reasons for the great increase in the American navy which took place from 1890 to 1895.

II

THE PERSONALITY OF WILHELM

The accession of the present Emperor marks a new step in the history of Realpolitik applied to foreign affairs. With Bismarck its principal stage was Europe; with the present Emperor its activities have become world-wide. This is possibly due in part to the fact that one of the earliest acts of his reign was to drop the old State-pilot Bismarck, who no doubt would have exercised a moderating effect on his many-sided activities. But before discussing the policy of the present reign it seems desirable to say a few words about the Emperor, who is in every sense of the word the "stage" villain of the piece.

The writer was in Germany very shortly after his accession. There was a curious nervousness about the people as to what the new sovereign was likely to do. They looked on him as a sort of unknown quantity, who was capable of springing any number of uncomfortable surprises on the German people. His restlessness was already proverbial. While they had nicknamed his grandfather *Der Greise Kaiser* (The Grey-

beard Kaiser) and his father *Der Weise Kaiser* (The Wise Kaiser), he was known as *Der Reise Kaiser* (The Roving Kaiser). His occasional fits of irritability were also feared; these are due, as we know now, to the most intense ear trouble. He has certainly not belied his early reputation of being everything by turns.

He is in Germany to-day the supreme authority on politics and on naval and military matters, be it *Dreadnoughts* or regimental buttons. He, again, is the supreme *arbiter elegantiarum* in art, literature, and religion. Many of the Madame Tussaud-like groups of statuary with which he has filled the Sieges-Allee at Berlin are the laughing-stock of the outside artistic world. The humourists describe the spot as the Sea of Marmora (Marble). The story of the Bode Statue is also well known. Dr. Bode, the Keeper of the Berlin Museum, purchased here in England a wax bust, really the work of an English artist named Lucas, which the German expert declared to be a genuine Leonardo da Vinci. In spite of a pair of nineteenth-century trousers being subsequently extracted from the statue, where they had served for stuffing, the Kaiser and

the official art critics of Germany have definitely declared that the work belongs to the Italian Renaissance. Again, it is within the memory of all that in the short space of an evening's conversation with one of the greatest Assyrian scholars he successfully, to the satisfaction of that great authority, reconciled the hitherto irreconcilable versions of Hammurabi and Moses.

In fact, owing to his prodigious versatility, there is nothing on which he does not lay down the law. Thanks to his multiple personality, he is ready at a moment's notice to act as his own special preacher or his own bandmaster. He is, indeed, the greatest virtuoso and dilettante of the twentieth century. Some years ago the writer defined him as a Nero in vanity but not in cruelty; perhaps the latter caveat may now be modified. It is curious to note that the great French statesman Clemenceau has recently applied to him the same title. One story comes to the mind of the writer which was current during the early nineties in Berlin. On a cold winter's day shortly after his accession, the Emperor ordered the banks of the Havel to be lined with miles upon miles of soldiers while he made a sort of triumphal

progress along the river to his palace at Potsdam. The result was that a not inconsiderable number of the soldiers who had to wait for hours on the banks died of exposure. We all know, again, his intolerance of independent criticism. It is fresh in the memories of many how he cashiered one of the most brilliant soldiers in Germany for a too frank criticism of the since somewhat discredited shock-tactics at the annual manœuvres.

Again, he has a mania for doing things off his own bat. At the opening of the Kiel Canal he called a council of war, at which, without consulting any one, he proposed that the whole German fleet should sail through the canal, attended by the vessels of the other nations which had been sent to take part in the celebrations. Every one applauded and said it was a magnificent idea. Directly after the meeting, however, the Senior Admiral of the German navy came to the Emperor and explained to him that if he did not wish to strand the whole of the German fleet in the middle of Holstein, as well as the ships of the visiting Powers, he must give up the project, as at most only two or three ships could follow one another

through at a time, the banks being unable to withstand a greater strain. This difficulty has since been remedied by the enlargement of the canal, which now, as we know, allows of the passage of the whole of the fleet.

As regards William's extraordinary impulsiveness, only those who are in his immediate entourage have any idea of the times, certainly frequently, he has projected some reckless coup or other which, happily for the peace of mind of the world, has never seen the light. The writer remembers very well one instance which came under his own personal observation. He was in 1896–97 in France, and on one occasion a friend in close touch with the French Foreign Office said to him: "Take care! William is going to play you a pretty trick." On inquiring what it might be, the Frenchman replied: "You must find it out for yourself." The writer shortly afterwards came to England and asked a friend what William had been up to. "Oh," said his friend, "I can tell you. I was in the House of Commons the other night and I met the correspondent of the *Standard*, who is just back from Berlin with the information that the German Em-

peror is proposing to send twenty thousand men to the Transvaal to help Kruger, and the Government does not exactly know what to do. To make it public would cause a tremendous hubbub in the country." The Government, however, made up its mind later, and subsequently a notice appeared in the English Press that the British squadron at the Cape had sailed under sealed orders. It turned up ultimately at Delagoa Bay, and nothing more apparently was heard of William's project, as might be expected, since, if we remember aright, the only German ship on the coast was an antiquated vessel called the *See-Adler*. When the writer returned to France he mentioned the story to his friend, who acknowledged that the writer's version was true.

One could also instance the celebrated telegram to Kruger, which, curiously enough, was followed up a few years later by the Emperor conferring on Lord Roberts the Black Eagle. This act brought amazement to the German people, who could not understand the highest decoration of the land being conferred on the soldier who had brought to naught the plans of Kruger. Equally impulsive and unconsidered was the presenta-

tion of the sword of honour to General Stössel for his defence of Port Arthur, a matter for which he was shortly afterwards court-martialled by the Russian authorities. In fact, instances of the way in which he "puts his foot in it" might be multiplied indefinitely.

And the terrible thing is that this is the man who deals, and has for years been dealing, with the destinies of millions of Germans and of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world. He may be the victim of a system, but he is also its executioner. He may be the slave of the German camarilla which surrounds him, yet its members are largely of his own picking and choosing. And one cannot forget his cynical remark: "When one occupies certain positions in the world, one ought to try to make dupes rather than friends." Brought up in the mediæval doctrine of the divine right of kings, no king has ever placed himself so nearly on a level with the Divinity. Even Louis XIV. never used the language that is the ordinary talk of the present Kaiser. And unfortunately, owing to the system that sets him on a sort of pedestal for all good Germans to admire and copy, his vanity and vainglory have un-

doubtedly encouraged in the Germans the national failings of bumptiousness and conceit. Yet one cannot believe that such a vacillating, not to say weak character is enamoured of anything but the external trappings of war. To him his army and navy have been first and foremost magnificent toys. To be a real "war lord" one must be made, like Napoleon, of sterner stuff. The bottom card of his character seems to be his passion for the spectacular. If he sanctions such atrocities as the burning of Louvain, one believes it is not so much from lust of blood as for the sake of the limelight. In a word, it is his love of the spectacular which leads him to sanction cruelties not his love of cruelty that leads him to such spectacular acts. Or, in other words, Nero burnt Rome out of sheer lust of cruelty; the Kaiser burnt Louvain to dismay the Belgians and dazzle the world with the glitter of his own stupendous might. All this cannot save him from the future odium of the human race, but it may explain, even if it does not excuse, his character.

III

THE POLICY OF WILHELM

His accession marked, of course, a new departure. Germany henceforth was to be a sea as well as a land power. In the pregnant words of the Kaiser, her future was to be upon the water (*Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser.*) With this policy in view, the Emperor in 1890, exchanged Zanzibar and Witu for Heligoland. He was much blamed at the time, and Germany was considered to have had much the worst of the bargain. Time has proved, however, that on this occasion the Emperor was absolutely right from the German point of view. A glance at the map will show how the island commands the mouths of the two important rivers, the Weser and the Elbe, on which the two principal ports of Bremen and Hamburg are respectively situated. Further, it commands the waterway leading to the Kiel Canal, and also the naval station of Wilhelmshaven. It is, in fact, the Gibraltar of the North.

Its very appearance is striking. Imagine a green tableland rising out of the sea, sur-

rounded by perpendicular sandstone cliffs. The green tableland to-day is largely covered by fortifications, and the cliffs themselves are protected from the sea by an armour belting, but still the old rhyme describing the island is largely true; it may roughly be translated thus:

Red is the cliff, white is the sand, green is the land;
These are the colours of Heligoland.

The late Lord Salisbury, who conducted the exchange, has been blamed since for making it, though he was much commended at the time; but the position was not so simple as it looks. It was captured by the English in 1807, though not officially recognized as British till 1814. It served as a smuggling station, which annoyed the Germans, and its possession by the English was naturally being regarded as a thorn in the German side. It threatened, in fact, to become as much an international sore as if we held, say, Calais at the present day. The action of Lord Salisbury was therefore largely justifiable on the ground that he was doing away with a bone of contention between the

two peoples. The importance attached by the Germans to its acquisition is to be seen from the fact that the German Emperor assumed in consequence the much-prized title of *Vermehrer des Deutschen Reiches* (Increaser of the German Realm).

But the Emperor William was not merely anxious to found a new German Empire on the seas. With the world as his stage he began to attempt to make his influence felt far beyond the limits of Europe. We have arrived, in fact, at the era of the Mailed Fist. Even German diplomacy began to assume a more dictatorial tone.

His first attempt was to rally the countries of Europe against the United States in the war between the latter and Spain. We refused to be dragged in, and the net result of his efforts was to reconcile us and the United States, in which bitter memories of our conduct in 1812 and in the War of Secession had hitherto survived. The writer was in the United States shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish War, and it was most interesting to see the way in which the Americans had thrown out of their schools the history books which had preached contempt and even hatred for the Britisher and sub-

stituted books animated with a totally different spirit. So complete is the *entente* with America to-day that we have been able practically to withdraw our fleet from the American side of the Atlantic. No doubt American sympathies with England were largely increased by our actual conduct during the war, as the presence of British ships at Manila probably prevented the German Admiral there from attacking Admiral Dewey. To this period belongs the well-known satirical poem *Meinself und Gott*, which charcterized for American eyes the megalomaniac views entertained by the Kaiser. Here are two verses:

Der Kaiser of dis Fatherland
Under Gott on high all dings command,
Ve two—ach! Don't you understand?
Meinself und Gott.

Dear grandma dinks she is nicht smal,
Mit Boers and such she interfere;
She'll larn none owns this hemisphere
But Me—und Gott.

Foiled in America, the Emperor next turned his attention to the East. His cry

of the Yellow Peril greatly interested Europe and profoundly annoyed the Japanese and the Chinese. Thanks to the vigorous action of Germany, Japan was obliged to abandon Port Arthur, the recovery of which was one of the chief aims of Japan—in fact, it finally led to the war with Russia. Next, Germany herself made the murder of two missionaries the pretext of extorting from the Chinese the lease of 200 square miles of territory known as Kiao-chau, which Japan is besieging to-day with a view to restoring it to China.

The Emperor, however, was more successful in using all his influence with the Tsar of Russia to induce him to go to war with Japan. His action is perfectly intelligible from the German point of view. The war relieved the pressure of something like three million men along the Austro-German frontiers. Until recently, in fact, the main Russian troops were situated at a distance of 100 to 150 kilometres from the frontier, on a triangle represented by Vilna, Warsaw, and, I believe, Kieff.

The disingenuous character of German diplomacy has, however, been particularly manifest at the Hague Conferences, the first

of which, it is well to remember, was summoned at the suggestion of the Tsar. Germany has always been at the bottom of the opposition to all proposals to limit armaments. Our attempts at an understanding with her over naval questions have been equally unsuccessful, commencing with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's proposals, which possibly gave rise to the idea that England was tired of the struggle, and ending with Mr. Churchill's suggestion of a naval holiday. It is instructive to note in this connexion the remarks of an English lady whose evidence is above suspicion. · She has lived so long in Germany that she has even adopted in some cases the German point of view. In *Eight Years in Germany* the lady, Miss Wyllie, says: "Now when I see a poster with Mr. Churchill's offer to Germany I blush with discomfort at the thought of the ribald amusement which the announcement is causing across the water." We find even the school prostituted to bolster up this doctrine of bloated armaments. In a German reader by P. Hoch, under the title, "For what use do we need a War Fleet," we read: "History further teaches us that never have armaments become too burdensome for a

nation; nay, trade and commerce have broadened and the national welfare has increased with the ability and readiness for war." We see now, if we did not see before, how all the pretence of the fleet for defensive purposes was only the second string to the German bow.

Meanwhile, however, Germany had been raising up on her eastern flank by her Machiavellian *Weltpolitik* an enemy which the most far-sighted German statesmen, like Bismarck, have ever dreaded, and which even her common people regard with terror to-day—Russia. Bismarck, in fact, always made it a point in appearance, if not in reality, to keep on good terms with Russia. He recognized the strong traditional ties of friendship between Russia and Prussia. The partition of Poland had formed a bond of union between the two countries, interested alike with Austria in punishing Polish risings in their several slices of Polish territory. Again, the fact that Germany had vast commercial interests in Russia, that Germany more than any other country had developed, if not exploited, Russia's commerce, was another puissant reason for keeping on good terms with the Colossus of the North; and,

lastly, there was the difficulty of waging a successful war with a country with so vast a territory and so multitudinous a population. Broadly speaking, the policy of the German Emperor, even with the Turks, has suffered from being, like all his actions, too spasmodic. He has alternately coquetted and quarrelled with the Russians; but of recent years affairs in the Balkans have led Germany to support Austria-Hungary more and more strongly, producing thereby a growing estrangement with Russia.

Before going further, however, it seems desirable to give a bird's-eye view of Austria-Hungary.

Austria-Hungary is a hotch-potch of nationalities. To judge by the number of its languages, official and unofficial, one might be inclined to say it was founded by refugees from the Tower of Babel. There are no less than seven official languages, as a glance at one of the official postcards will show.

There are four main races—Teutonic, Hungarian, Latin, and Slavonic of all kinds. The Germans are in a majority in Austria proper and the Tyrol. The Hungarians, who live in the Hungarian plain, are a non-European race with probable affinities with the

Finns. The Latins include the Italians in the Trentino, Trieste, and along the Dalmatian littoral, and three million Roumanians in that part of Hungary which once formed part of the ancient Roman kingdom of Dacia. The Slavonic races include the Bohemians or Czechs, the Poles, Ruthenians, Slovacs, Croats, and Serbs.

A glance at the map of Austria will show its extremely strong natural position, bounded as it is on nearly every side by mountains or rivers except in Galicia, where it occupies the outer slopes of the Carpathians, the scene of the first struggles of the campaign against Russia. But this strong natural position is largely nullified by the bitter hatred entertained by the various members of this composite nation for one another. Austrians detest Hungarians, Hungarians loathe the Croats, Poles are jealous of Hungarians, Hungarians are despised by the Roumanians, the Ruthenians are at daggers drawn with the Poles, and so on. Austria-Hungary may not inaptly be described as a mutual distrust society. One small but significant point will illustrate the case. The writer one day was watching the Olympian Games when held in Paris in 1900. A Hungarian

happened to win the discus, and the French band, who were apparently not up to the nicer geographical differences that mean so much in some foreign countries—a trait not uncommon among their countrymen—struck up the Austrian National Anthem. The Hungarian sprang out before the whole band and cried, "Not that —— thing, please!"

Obviously for Austria one of her chief dangers has long been the possibility of the various Slavs within her boundaries and beyond combining in one or more units with a view to seeking their independence. Unluckily for the Slavs, they are divided by religion. Poland and Bohemia were Christianized from the West, and are therefore Roman Catholic. The Ruthenians in Poland use the Greek rite, but acknowledge the authority of the Pope. Under this internecine struggle of races lie the cankers of a perpetual struggle between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Greek Church. All sorts of attempts have been made by the Austrians to keep the Croats and the Serbs in the south apart, and when religion has failed recourse has been made to treason trials, of which the later ones have a particularly unsavoury name, as the evidence

produced at them by the Austrian Government was proved for the most part to be forged. It seems probable in the opinion of competent witnesses that the Catholic Croats, tired of being made cat's-paws of by Austria, will ultimately throw in their lot with their Orthodox brethren the Serbs.

The struggle between Austria as a Teutonic outpost and the Slavonic races goes back a long way. Little by little in the race to Constantinople the contest has grown to be a life-and-death struggle between the protagonists of the two races—Austria and Russia. Hitherto Austria has nearly always managed to outwit Russia. It is not generally known in England that the reason why the Russians agreed to conclude peace in the Crimean War was not so much because the French and English had taken Sebastopol, some thousands of miles away from the heart of their empire, as because Austria threatened to intervene with fresh troops at a moment when Russia was financially exhausted. Again, in 1878, when the Russians were obliged to turn back from the very gates of Constantinople and tear up the treaty of San Stefano, it was not so much the British action in sending the fleet to Basika Bay as

the threat of Austria to step across the Russian line of retreat and cut off the Russian army that compelled the Russians to give in when victory seemed within their grasp. And yet again it was the Austrian Minister (Count Aehrenthal) who completely outwitted the Russians when he definitely annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. On this occasion, no doubt, Russia would have made the matter a *casus belli* had not the German Emperor, "the knight in shining armour" (ever with a view to the spectacular!), proclaimed his resolution to draw the sword for Austria. What Germany has certainly done has been to draw down upon herself the accumulated hatred of all the Slavs, Russia included. The threats of six years ago have made the war against Germany to-day a holy war.

It is really this deep-seated jealousy between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other that has rendered the Balkan problem so difficult of solution in the past. These two parties must share the chief responsibility, though Russia in a less degree because she has at least been working for Slav interests as well as her own. But collectively they must be

held liable for the Armenian massacres, the unnumbered Balkan outrages, and for the Balkan War itself. England and France, as members of the European Concert, have been collaterally responsible, though, unhappily, powerless. Realpolitik as practised in the Balkans has brought out the damning fact that, with certain exceptions, the relations of nations to one another are primarily little better than those of wild beasts. One has no hesitation in saying that to-day Europe is paying with its own blood for the innocent blood shed in the Balkans. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." Nations no more than individuals can escape the consequences of their acts.

The close co-operation of Austria with Germany became still more apparent in the two great crises of Algeciras and Agadir, in which the Mailed Fist was brandished in the face of France. They are both too recent to need extended notice. It will be remembered that in the first case the resignation of M. Delcassé as Foreign Minister probably saved France from war, and in the second, when Germany once more attempted to take France into a corner alone and bully her into commercial concessions in Morocco and else-

where, Mr. Lloyd George saved the situation by stating that the English Government claimed the right to be represented at these private interviews. Throughout all these crises, and especially the earlier one provoked by the annexation of Bosnia, the Emperor William was in close connexion with the Austrian heir-apparent. One knows on excellent authority that the Bosnian coup at least was actually plotted by the two during a previous visit made by the Archduke to the Emperor. The tragedy of Sarajevo was therefore a severe blow to the Emperor William. It is doubtful, also, whether after all the Archduke was not murdered with the connivance of certain persons in high places in Austria. It is well known that, owing to his morganatic marriage, the Archduke's accession was looked forward to with dismay at Vienna, all the more as there was a good probability that his consort would be recognized as Queen of Hungary by the Hungarian Government. One hears also on very trustworthy authority that the Archduke was suffering from a complaint that affected his brain, and that some of the most eminent doctors and legists had been consulted as to the possibility of

setting him aside from the Austrian succession. It appears that nothing could be done. In these circumstances the fact of his going to Sarajevo assumes peculiar significance once it is realized that the entire arrangements for his visit were left in the hands not of the civil but of the military authorities. It will doubtless be recalled that after the first attempt on his life he actually reproached the burgomaster of the town for not having taken any steps to secure his safety. It is obvious that to send any one to a place swarming with spies, disaffected persons, and possible assassins without making the slightest attempt to take the police precautions which are necessary even in a town like London, was a direct incentive and even invitation to the assassination of one who was the embodied enemy of the Serbian race. One is not writing here to defend assassination, though it may be pointed out that just as little boys are often what big boys make them, so are little States what they are largely as a result of the treatment they have received from their bigger neighbours. Moreover, the record of Austria as regards forged evidence is so bad that we may well suspend judgment on the matter.

As for Austria's subsequent conduct in presenting an ultimatum like a pistol at the head of Servia, it is clear at the present time that the ultimatum was a mere *querelle d'Allemand*. Not only was Servia willing to give satisfaction on ten points out of twelve, but from the King's telegram to the Emperor William, subsequently published in a White Paper, it is clear that either from England or Russia, or perhaps both, a definite suggestion had been made that Austria should hold Belgrade and certain Servian territories till she was satisfied. The offer to Austria to act as her own bailiff would appear to cut the ground right away from under her feet.

To sum up then. For the last twenty-five years there has been a gradual revelation of the Mailed Fist through the entire world—in America with the United States, in Asia with China and Japan, in Europe with France, Russia, and ourselves. With the lapse of time the policy appears to have become more cynical and brazen-faced. Bismarck could handle the diplomatic knuckle-duster as well as any one; but he was as careful as any one to observe the *convenances*, to paper over the cracks (to use his own phrase), to do the

requisite lip-service to virtue. But the persisting rattling of the sabre has, to use the words of Harden, the leading journalist of Germany, left that country without a friend in the world—unless we make a possible exception of the Turks.

On the other hand, it has reconciled nations that had hitherto been estranged, such as England and the United States, England and France, England and Russia, France and Italy, and, last but not least, it has reconciled our own jarring parties in England and Ireland and forged between ourselves and our Colonies new links of Empire. Slowly, gradually, inevitably, it is dawning on the rest of the world that Germany by her conduct of the last twenty-five years has made herself the enemy of the human race. Like ancient Sparta, her hegemony of the world, such as it has been, has been exercised for ill, and, like ancient Sparta, her fall will be rapid. In the short space of forty-three years she has shown herself unable to bear that greatest of all burdens, the burden of prosperity.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES

I

STRENGTH

If we wish to understand the German position—and there are things to be said for it—it is essential that we try to look at the world from the German point of view. We must not allow ourselves to be led away by the recent excesses of the German soldiers into thinking that there is no German side of the case.

1. We will consider first the physical position of Germany. Except on the Austrian frontier, which is secure from attack, the German frontier west, and especially west, is very largely an artificial frontier. Germany has, in fact, been defined as an armed

camp in a plain. She is, certain fortresses apart, particularly exposed to invasion. She has suffered fearfully in the past not only from invasion but from internecine strife. For her it is a case not only of *Die Wacht am Rhein* but *die Wacht* everywhere, while the need of being strong within has been borne upon her by the terrible experiences she has undergone in the past through being a divided nation. There may be some little undue swagger about the German sword, but there has also been a certain need for it, though whether a policy of hostile enmity with all one's neighbours makes for peace or even for national safety in the long run is also open to doubt.

2. In forty years, the country, comparatively poor before 1870, has grown rich and powerful. People are so well off that emigration has practically stopped, though the population is going up by leaps and bounds. And yet German expansion has been nearly everywhere prevented. Here is a nation that in some ways is the strongest and best organized in Europe, but is hemmed round with a ring of weak nations; it feels it could overrun in a week Belgium, Holland, Denmark, while abroad it has been checkmated in its

efforts to found colonies or to acquire spheres of influence in Brazil, the Philippines, in South Africa (Walfisch Bay), in the Transvaal, in Morocco, in Asia Minor, let alone the tempting colonies of such apparently decadent nations as Portugal and Spain, which are to-day naturally on our side. The mere fact that her own diplomacy has failed to increase her territory or spheres of influence of recent years, while at times unduly exciting her hopes, as in the case of Morocco, has no doubt produced a certain amount of latent exasperation in Germany, though the failure be due in part to the Prussian-boot methods in international affairs.

3. The Germans have built up a splendid overseas trade, and yet all their trade routes except those to Northern Europe are commanded by this confounded little island of Great Britain that lies sprawling across them. Again, before the building of the Kiel Canal their coast-borne commerce had actually to pass through foreign straits when going from eastern ports to western.

And, finally, two of their four principal ports, Antwerp and Rotterdam, are not situated in Germany at all. Rotterdam to-day is actually a bigger port than London,

and its greatness is mainly due to the German commerce it handles. No wonder, then, that Germany is always bringing pressure to bear on Belgium and Holland, especially the latter—threatening to make a German mouth to the Rhine, or to engage in a tariff war if Holland refuses to join the Postal Union or the Zollverein or to fortify Flushing and spend £3,000,000 on the job. Fancy a country with a population of six million odd being asked to spend £3,000,000 on fortifying a port to please the Germans—a proportion which would be represented by £25,000,000 in our own case! The very largeness of the sum indicates the intense pressure employed behind the scenes. No wonder that, a few days before the war, Holland finally conceded to Thyssen, a German millionaire, the right to build a separate port!

No wonder either that Holland and Denmark are, for the moment, observing the strictest neutrality. They have no illusion as to their fate if England and Russia are beaten, but they do not mean to give any grounds for offence to their huge neighbour. The Germans who have been through their country have scores of times indicated to them what their ultimate fate will be. I re-

call going into Copenhagen Harbour some twenty-four years ago on a German steamer with many Danes on board, and I remember well how the Germans, without troubling about the presence of the Danes, discussed the ease with which the fortifications guarding the entrance could be taken or destroyed. The Germans spoke and acted as if they were actually *en pays conquis*.

4. The growing estrangement with Russia has brought the Germans face to face with the nightmare of that mighty struggle of Slav *v.* Teuton. On a recent visit to Germany scarcely three months ago, the writer was profoundly impressed by the latent dread of this struggle, which seemed omnipresent in the mind of every one he met. Your German is singularly incapable of hiding his real feelings. One could not help feeling sorry for them, even if they have to some extent, brought it on themselves. It may well mean, however, in their struggle with Russia, that this dread will animate them with the courage of despair.

5. And lastly, during the last twenty-five years especially, the Prussian-made idea has been gradually growing and spreading in Germany that the Germans are the chosen

people of this world, that it is their destiny to proselytize the world with German ideas. In a country in which everything is done by system it is only necessary to run an idea long enough to get it accepted by the great mass of the people—all the more so in this case as it is one that appeals to national self-esteem.

Now this appeal to national esteem has been bound up with a systematic attempt to depreciate the rest of the world. We English would do well not to fall into this most common of mistakes, to despise our enemies, especially when the enemy is powerful and well-organized, and we would do well when figuring out the chances of the present campaign to over-appreciate rather than to depreciate the vast strength of Germany.

Especially let us admire—one may admire even in an enemy that which is good—their indomitable industry, their prodigious thoroughness, their unbounded belief in knowledge, their systematic way of dealing with social, economic, or industrial problems. We may well consider the splendid fashion in which they have built up, in the last forty years, their great industries, their transport system of railways and canals, and their

merchant marine, or transformed their existing towns or built up new ones by systematic town-planning. Take the case, for instance, of Frankfort, though it is not an isolated one, where, by purchasing all the land for miles around, the authorities have been able to extend the town on scientific lines, avoiding the creation of slums and providing adequate means of approach and access to the centre. One has only to compare the haphazard way in which our English big centres of population have grown, to note the difference. On our system, or non-system, the town throws off a number of satellites, genteel suburbs or suburban slums as the case may be, generally both, certainly slums. In due course, the town boundaries are extended and the suburban satellites incorporated in the towns, but no attempt has been made to link them up properly with broad thoroughfares, much less to develop them initially on scientific lines. The consequence is that the average town is a kind of multicellular conglomeration of smaller towns and rookeries, a sort of agglutinative honeycomb of overgrown villages round an ancient and possibly overcrowded borough. Take, again, a seaport like Bremen, an ancient town with a varied

history. Bremen is a garden city. Except in the heart of the town there are gardens everywhere, sometimes only of a few square feet, but always excellently kept; and where there is no room for a garden, there the houses are covered with creepers or there are boxes of flowers outside the windows. Every one takes a civic pride in his garden and his flowers. Even the working-class quarters are clean, well built, and, as far as one can judge, there are no slums. Take, again, the splendid sanitation of the big cities. Berlin has a population of millions, yet its streets are a picture of cleanliness. Then the management of the hospitals, and, in fact, of all public institutions, seems admirable. Consider, for instance, the excellent Elberfeld system, where each well-to-do family promises to look after two or three families (no more) of less well-to-do people and act as friend to those families—a system that might well be copied by us, if followed in the non-patronizing spirit in which it is carried out in Germany.

But a book might be written about the way in which brains have been put into the management of local and Government services in Germany. There is not the slightest

doubt that the German officials are by far the most efficient in Europe. Their task is rendered easier by the profound belief of the people themselves in the bureaucratic machine, whether civil or military. It is possible to regulate everything in Germany. One might instance the prohibition of piano-playing after 10 P.M., a very necessary thing considering the number of pianos in the average German five-storied flat.

One can speak without reserve of the strength of German family life, of the absence of luxury except in the big towns, of the fine side of German simplicity, of the German *Gemüthlichkeit* (the charming affability of the Southern German, so different from the crude manners of the Prussian), of German cleanliness (especially noticeable in the case of the children of the poor), of German cheerfulness, of German thrift, of German hospitality and warmness of heart, and of the German sense of duty. It is not merely the fear of the officer's sword or revolver that makes the German face death on the battlefield; far more potent is the sense of duty to the Fatherland. Especially is this true of the German officer. Only the other day the papers were full of the story of a German

officer who when taken to Petrograd as a prisoner would not give his name, but merely reiterated: "I have sinned against the Fatherland."

One must praise also the steady refusal of German economists to interpret political economy, as too many of our own economists have done, in the sense of mere money-grubbing instead of in the far wider and deeper sense of national weal, including the well-being of the civilized world as well as the science of capital and labour. Then, again, one must praise the care that Germany has shown for labour by introducing insurance against sickness and unemployment, to which allusion has already been made, and by the steady protection extended by the State to the small employer.

A word also must be said for her educational system or systems (Prussian, Bavarian, and others), although the elementary education is probably the weakest section. It is certainly inferior to our English elementary system, however much that might in the mind of some critics need improvement. But it is probably no longer true to say that her elementary system is so much snow shovelled in to fill up a watertight compart-

ment labelled elementary; yet it is not so long ago that there were 120,000 half-timers in Prussia. On the other hand, her system of secondary education is, from certain points of view, the most complete in the world, and the mere numbers attending her universities are profoundly impressive. In twenty-one German universities there were in attendance during the winter session of 1913, 59,601 persons, of whom 3686 were women; and if the number of mere "auditors" be added, the total is raised to over 65,000. The students at all our British and Irish universities do not come near half this number. Naturally, the magnificent State grants to the universities, running into over £1,000,000, compare most favourably with our State grants, which amount to little over £100,000. This does not take into account such splendid technical high schools as Charlottenburg, with its six thousand and more students of university rank in chemistry, engineering, and the various mechanical arts and crafts. The technical work done at our provincial universities and in London, good as it is, cannot compare with these impressive numbers.

But one of the most recent and important improvements inaugurated in Germany is

that of the new continuing education which bridges the chasm between the elementary school and the workshop, and which is largely due to the genius of P. Michenstraus of Munich. It largely solves the problem of unskilled labour by giving opportunities for the pupils to join the ranks of the skilled or improves their existing skill. It will undoubtedly be the most pressing educational problem for this country when the inevitable "clear up" after the war takes place. Considerations of space prevent one from speaking in anything more than a general way of the German powers of organization in the various spheres of national life, including her wonderful preparation for war, which, as we know, has been all along her chief preoccupation.

The following vivid quotation of an American correspondent of an army corps on the way to France will illustrate in a nutshell the German capacity for scientific organization under the actual test of experience:

"For five solid hours, travelling always at express train speed, we motored between walls of marching men.

"We passed regiment after regiment, brigade after brigade of infantry, after them hussars, Uhlans, cuirassiers, field batteries,

more infantry, more field guns, ambulances, then siege guns each drawn by thirty horses, engineers, telephone corps, pontoon waggons, armoured motor-cars, more Uhlans, more infantry in spike helmets, all sweeping by as irresistibly as a mighty river, their faces turned toward France.

"Every contingency seems to have been provided for.

"The maps of Belgium with which every soldier is provided are the finest examples of topography I have ever seen, every path, farm, building, and clump of trees being shown.

"At one place a huge army waggon containing a complete printing-press was drawn up beside the road, and a morning edition of *Deutsche Krieger Zeitung* was being printed and distributed to the passing men.

"Field kitchens rumbled down the lines serving steaming soup and coffee to the men, who held out tin cups and had them filled without once breaking step.

"There were waggons filled with army cobblers sitting cross-legged on the floor mending soldiers' shoes.

"Other waggons, which were to all appearances ordinary two-wheeled farm carts, hid

under their arched canvas covers nine machine guns, which could instantly be brought into action.

"The medical corps was magnificent, as businesslike and perfectly equipped and efficient as a great city hospital. Men on bicycles with coils of insulated wire strung field telephones from tree to tree, so that the general commanding could converse with any part of the fifty-mile-long column.

"The whole army never sleeps. When half is resting the other half is advancing.

"The soldiers are treated as valuable machines which must be speeded up to the highest possible efficiency. Therefore they are well fed, well shod, well clothed, and worked as a negro teamster works a mule."

The passage is most significant as illustrating the extraordinary capacity of the Germans for scientific organization, making them easily in this respect the first nation in the world. It also indicates to what depths of servitude the policy of the beehive carried to its logical conclusion can reduce the individual human being.

II

WEAKNESSES

Most of these advantages have their shady side.

Obedience to authority makes the German disinclined to think for himself, and as a corollary the German bureaucrat tends irresistibly to think first of his caste, then of the State, and, last and least, of the general public or its convenience. This caste spirit is particularly exemplified in the case of the German officer. Only lately one read in the paper of a German lieutenant who, as a prisoner, was being conveyed with his men in a French train. He requested his captors to put him in a carriage by himself, as to travel in the same carriage with his men was derogatory to his dignity! This *régime* of excessive regulations explains why so few German-Americans return to settle permanently in Germany. They find it, indeed, swept and garnished compared with the general untidiness and unfinishedness across the water, but they cannot breathe its stifling atmosphere. Moreover, materialism and luxury have made sad ravages in the big towns and the

army. Germany has had of recent years more than her fair share of scandals. It is to be feared that such books as *Aus einer Kleinen Garnison* represent more than isolated plague spots.

German education, again, has one very grave defect. It is spoon-fed right up to the university. Only one side is put before the pupil. This is specially noticeable in the teaching of history, where, at least until recently, no standard authors were read even in the highest classes, much less were original sources consulted. The brunt of the work fell on the class teacher, who lectured to the class, whose duty it was to get up the lectures by heart, eked out by the jejune pabulum of some small historical *résumé* or compendium. All this, of course, was thoroughly mastered by each individual pupil. The German boy is expected, like a healthy bullock or sheep, to clear out all the pabulum set before him before the scholastic bins are refilled with fresh fodder. But the result of this one-sided education is disastrous. It probably accounts for the dogmatic manner of the present-day German. Unless he can overwhelm you with a frontal attack of certain facts he has mastered, he can merely

take refuge in loud, uncultured assertion. Personally the writer has never been able to argue with a German—or at least with a North German. Invariably he found that the German was totally in the right and he was totally in the wrong. It also explains how again and again one comes across some distinguished man whose knowledge of his own facts or small allotment of knowledge is dazzling, but whose opinions on other topics appear either childish or machine-made. He has, in fact, been trained and permitted to think only on matters connected with his own subject. This may seem to some a small detail, but it indicates, I believe, that in their present state of mind there is only one argument Germans will recognize because they have been taught to bow down and worship it; namely, that of superior force. We know now that they look upon half measures and offers of compromise as signs of weakness, or, worse, of stupidity.

Again, school is no pleasant place for the majority. It is a sort of Purgatorio for the average boy. The atmosphere is strict. The teachers are men of culture with high and even austere ideals. In private life, they are often men of the most kindly disposition.

But a system that of late years has grown more and more military has ordained that they shall preserve an iron or at least a sort of official discipline that discourages anything like the friendliness that exists between master and boy in England. A friend once asked a goodly number of ex-secondary schoolboys in Germany if they wished ever to see any of their masters again. The answer was a universal No. One cannot but think that this was an extreme case, but that the system itself is to blame one has little doubt. Recently, two Japanese professors came to England to study our public school system. They said that when starting their secondary schools they had copied the German system, but they perceived that to-day the German school did everything except turn out men. "England," said one of them with a certain amount of pardonable exaggeration, "is a thousand years ahead of Germany."

But if the school is hardly a Paradise to the good boy, it is often a real Inferno to the dull and incompetent. The yearly statistics of schoolboy suicides among those who have failed to secure the certificate for military exemption indicates the frightful over-pres-

sure the average boy is subjected to on the part alike of his teachers and his parents. It would seem that the moral sword and revolver are too much in evidence. Broadly speaking, I believe it is not unfair to state that the school does not aim at cultivating the initiative or invention of the pupils, but at turning out submissive supporters of the throne and altar. What keeps the school going is the intense belief of teachers and taught in the value and power of knowledge.

This submissiveness and excessive belief in knowledge again plays into the hand of the bureaucrats. From the humblest postman to the most august official, they all appear to English or American eyes to be suffering from chronic swelled head; in short, miniature editions of the great Panjandrum of all—the Kaiser.

Personally, I believe that this splendid administration is bought at too high a price, and to an English mind, at least, the English method, though some of its results cannot rival those of the Germans, appears the more excellent way. We in England put the expert under a committee of laymen, whether it be Parliament or a county council. We keep him in his place—perhaps at times too much

in his place. As an expert in the subject of education I can speak feelingly. But undoubtedly it is a fault on the right side. Englishmen do not forget, as the expert is apt to forget, that they are dealing with human beings and not statistics.

Moreover, I do not believe in the German principle of delegating everything to superior persons. I believe that in the end, one would find too often he had delegated his own soul.

But Germany has other peculiar problems to deal with. For the Kaiser and his Government there is always the standing menace of the Social Democrats. These constitute the most cruel dilemma one can imagine. The Kaiser, in his need of wealth to run his army and navy, is obliged to do all he can to foster and encourage the industrializing of the activities of the community. Unfortunately, an industrial population is always democratic and anti-feudal. So the greater the success the Kaiser secures in promoting commerce and industry, the greater becomes the number of those who may ultimately prove his overthrow. Here alone was a danger which with the lapse of time must inevitably have driven the Kaiser to save his throne by a foreign war.

As it is, the Social Democrats now comprise the largest party in the country. Unfortunately for the constitutional progress of German political life, at the outset they adopted as their programme the realization of certain Socialistic ideals involving an entire reconstitution of society on more or less Utopian lines. Such millenarian visions, however fine and splendid they may be, have no chance, short of revolution, of being fulfilled in Germany. Yet for a long time the Socialists obstinately clung to their propaganda and refused to have any part or lot with the powers that be or even with the other parties in the way of forwarding social or political reforms. This intransigent, purely negative attitude merely meant that they were "agin the Government" and nothing more. More recently, however, they have grown more opportunistic, thanks to a large extent to the influence of Bernstein, who lived for several years in England and whose name appeared at the end of a circular in favour of peace at the outbreak of the war—a fine and brave thing which may have entailed on him the most serious consequences. But, broadly speaking, the Socialists have been a party of discontent

(exponent of the eternal No! of the *Geist der stets verneint*), and they have effected no political reforms.

What reforms have been carried have been carried by the Government—and have consisted of a goodly number of genuine social reforms designed to steal the Socialists' thunder and of a certain number of more or less sham political ones. Thus Germany possesses universal suffrage, but its possession implies merely the right to send a delegate to a talking shop which advises or can refuse money but has no power of initiative, while the constituencies to-day are even more unequal than those in Great Britain. Moreover, ministers are responsible only to the Kaiser, who can dissolve Parliament whenever he thinks fit. Germany, so far as a Parliamentary Government goes, is about as advanced as our Parliament under the Tudors.

Looking then at the political situation as a whole, one may say, broadly speaking, that there are two Germanies, one consisting of the Government and the whole civil and military hierarchy, headed by the Kaiser, and the other, of the rest of the German people. The German Government is, in

fact, the last word in Scientific Feudalism. Germany is really a farm run on highly scientific principles. The people are as well looked after as the prize sheep and cattle on up-to-date farms, but they no more run the country than the pedigree stock runs the farm. They are regulated from above and not by themselves.

But why don't they help themselves? How can they?

Free speech and free criticism are difficult if not impossible. To begin with, the present Kaiser is a sort of Imperial gramophone on every possible topic, and to criticize his utterances—and one may possibly criticize them unknowingly—may lead to a charge of *Majestäts-beleidigung* and a more or less prolonged term of imprisonment. It is really less dangerous to blaspheme the Deity than to take the name of the Kaiser in vain. The most casual remark to a friend in the street or a restaurant may be reported, and the speaker clapped into prison. There is an amusing story to this effect about a man who in the street happened to say, "The Kaiser is a damned fool." Up at once popped a policeman, who cried, "I arrest you for *Majestäts-beleidigung*." "Oh," cried the

victim, "I meant the Austrian Kaiser." "No, no," retorted the policeman. "That's impossible!"

But not only is the Kaiser's divinity hedged in by special legal protections: the person of the meanest bureaucrat is also sacrosanct, in a less degree. I believe, in fact, that there is a graduated scale of penalties according to the rank of the official affected. A sharp retort or a rudely worded letter will bring the author at once into contact with the authorities for *Beamter beleidigung* (insults to officials). An official once claimed from a German the sum of one or two pfennigs, less than a farthing. He received in reply a jocose letter, which brought down on the sender a fine of something like ten marks.

Free criticism is rendered more difficult by the fact that there are hardly any free papers, in Prussia at least, except the *Vorwärts*, the Socialist organ. Moreover, until about six years ago, the Press laws were so strict that German newspapers were obliged to keep a man of straw whose name appeared at the bottom of the paper, but who as often as not contributed nothing to its pages. His function was well described by his title, *Sitz-*

Redactum, or Sitting Editor, as he was obliged to go and sit in prison if the paper published anything that was subsequently condemned. Things are now better as far as these offences are concerned, though prosecutions for *Majestäts-beleidigung* still occur from time to time. Allusion has already been made to the so-called *Welfenfonds*, which is used to control the Press, a bad practice started by Bismarck. This so-called Reptile Press is even worse than a Yellow Press. For a Yellow Press does at least produce what it thinks people would like to read, while a Reptile Press produces what a Government wants them to read. Hence, certain official doctrines and dogmas are perpetually preached in season and out in the subsidized Press: notably the decadence of England, the hopeless corruption of France, the barbarity of Russia, and the beauties of that only true brand of culture—the German.

It is a thousand pities that the intellectual *élite* of the nation, and especially the university professors, have for the most part prostituted their brains to the propagation of these same pestilential doctrines. One has only to cite such persons as the historian Treitschke, who could never mention the

Russians without calling them apes, while the Englishman was his special aversion. For him the Englishman was a low utilitarian, a narrow and selfish islander, a hypocrite who, with the Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the other, diffuses throughout the universe the benefits of civilization. Unfortunately, he has left behind him a school of Chauvinistic historians who have poisoned the wells of truth, and, what is worse, the tens of thousands of German students. This rally of the intellectuals in the universities is due no doubt in part to the fact that in spite of the supposed *Universitäts freiheit* (so sadly learned to-day) they are really State servants, and great must be the pressure that can be put upon them. One prefers to think that with some there is also a more honourable motive; that they are in fact carrying on the tradition of the old mediæval universities when canonists like our fine old William of Occam offered to place his pen at the service of the Emperor against the Pope, in return for the former's protection, in the memorable words: *Ego te calamo defendam tu me gladio defendas* ("I will defend thee with my pen, if thou wilt defend me with thy sword").

There is, however, every reason to fear that this narrow Chauvinistic spirit has been greatly on the increase of late in Germany. Not long ago the writer was informed by a most distinguished French philosopher, who is also a member of the Academy, that even scientific discoveries and inventions by French people were gradually being boycotted by the German scientific periodicals. To such an extent, apparently, had the idea that German culture was the only true culture eaten into the souls of German scholars and men of science.

The most extreme among these Chauvinistic people are the Pan-Germans, who have merely reduced *Deutschland über alles* to a logical formula. Germany's duty (note how one of the keywords of German life is distorted to an immoral purpose) is to reconquer as soon as possible all countries or parts of countries that have been at any time German. I once saw a Pan-German map at the Exhibition at Brussels (in the *Educational* section be it noted!). It included in the Greater Germany of the future Holland, Belgium, parts of Hungary, Italy, France, and Russia. I cannot remember whether it roped in Scandinavia also, but it is quite possible it

did. I could not help wondering when seeing this map exhibited in their own country by their German guests, what the Belgians themselves thought about the matter. They have, however, given their impressions since. This Pan-German feeling has been fostered by the publication of Houston Chamberlain's book on *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. It is by an Englishman who has lived many years in Germany. The book takes for its thesis that the Germans are the salt of the earth and its predestined regenerators, and, if I remember aright, the hypothesis is put forward that Christ was a Teuton.

Even the schools are infected with this Chauvinism. A school geography in its 232d edition contains the statement that the Germans are *the* civilized people of Europe, and that all real civilization elsewhere, including France, where only one fifth of the race can possibly be of German origin, is due to German blood. A little German blood goes a long way!

After this the Bernhardis and other fire-eaters seem a natural and inevitable product.

No wonder the masses, in spite of their Social Democratic tenets, suffer like the rest

from national swelled head, since the leaders of rank and intellect have gone thus astray. Bebel has more than once pointed out how this gospel of national success has intoxicated the rank and file. He called them *Sieges-betrunken* (victory-intoxicated), and spoke of this *Sieges-lust* (passion for victory).

As we have seen, there is little home criticism possible of German institutions, and, on the other hand, very little foreign criticism is allowed to percolate into the country, if unfavourable to the Government's views. Ninety-seven per cent. of the papers get their foreign news through Wolff's Agency, and Wolff's Agency is but an annex of the Wilhelmstrasse or German Foreign Office, where the notorious Dr. Hammann, the organizer of German paper victories, holds sway. It is only necessary to recall that the above agency, thanks to its exclusive sources of news, has already "started" civil war in Ulster, revolution in Paris, and revolt in Petrograd. After this it is quite a minor matter to find that it has burnt down Odessa twice and limited the number of English recruits to about 2000 at a time when they were nearly 100,000.

The German people have therefore been

living in a vicious circle, unable to criticize their own Government and its institutions at home, and surrounded by a Chinese wall of ignorance and conceit which cuts them off from foreign criticism.

Nothing but a crushing and shattering defeat can bring them to their real senses and allow spiritual Germany, immured in the nethermost dungeons of Prussian Realpolitik, once more to emerge.

There is one other German fault that it is pertinent to note here, and that is their inability either to colonize abroad, or to Germanize conquered people at home. Of their actual colonies, only Togoland, already captured by the British, has paid its way. Togoland is a tropical colony. The one form of colonization they seem capable of successfully carrying out is the systematic planting of spies in friendly countries, Belgium, England, France, Holland, and the like. Spying no doubt is a necessary evil, but it is one thing to employ professional spies or men who undertake it for the fun or adventure of the thing and are willing to pay the price if captured, and quite another matter to enlist wholesale the people who come to this or any other country mainly to

earn their living and enjoy its trade and political advantages.

As regards their inability to turn conquered people into contented Germans, their record in Poland after a hundred years, in Schleswig after nearly fifty, in Alsace after over forty, is one of complete failure. It stands in striking contrast with the success of the French, who appear in this matter to have inherited some of the traditions of the ancient Roman Empire. When France annexed Savoy and Nice in 1861, she not only took a plebiscite of the two provinces as to whether they wished to be French or Italian, but she also obtained the consent of the Italian Parliament. The plebiscite resulted in the populations concerned electing to become French, and to-day France does not contain any more devoted citizens. Take, again, the case of Mulhouse. The town itself was actually free up to the time of the French Revolution, and voluntarily offered to become part and parcel of the Republic. A busybody once complained to Napoleon that the people of Alsace spoke German. He replied, "*Laissez à ces braves gens leur langue. Ils sabrent bien en Français.*" To any one, be he a native from Senegal or

Madagascar, the French say, "You have now become a citizen of the finest country in the world," and he remains a devoted citizen ever after. They appeal, in fact, to his self-esteem. Our way is different. We appeal to a man's sense of freedom and independence and responsibility. We create vast semi-independent communities like Canada or South Africa, and our success, judging by the spontaneous rally of our Dominions to the flag, is equally great. The Germans try coercion and police methods of all kinds. They appeal to fear, and the result is a hopeless failure.

To sum up, if this very rough analysis of Germany's strength and weaknesses be fairly correct, we see that Germany on the one hand is the most triumphant example of science and human brains applied to State-building, while on the other the absence of more human qualities in the soul of her architects of State has resulted in the individual being sacrificed too much to the State and the spiritual side subordinated too much to the material. In a word, instead of science being regarded as the handmaiden of religion in the widest sense, religion has been made the bondswoman

of science. Germany is a science-ridden State.

Now the most irresistible pressure of science is ever toward uniformity, and the selection of one solution and the rejection of all others. What is more natural than that the Germans, in whom science had become the bone of their bone and the flesh of their flesh, should come to regard their civilization as *the* civilization of the world, especially when it seems so magnificent when measured in terms of material things, with which science alone can deal? If, then, their civilization is the best, in fact, the perfect one, the only necessary one, then clearly all others are either imitations or degenerate or bastard civilizations.

The step from believing that their civilization is the best in the world to that of believing that it is their duty to impose their civilization everywhere is easy. And so we arrive at the conception of the Germans being a chosen people.

I had already spoken of them as the chosen people when I came across the actual phrase in a telegram from Petrograd to the *Morning Post*, giving a speech of the Emperor to his troops, in which the following passage occurred:

"Remember that the German people are the *chosen* of God. On me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am his weapon, his sword, and his vicegerent. Woe to the disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!"

That this creed is not held by the Emperor alone is to be seen from the diary of a German officer given in the *Daily Mail:*

"To-night William the Great has given us beautiful advice. 'You think every day of your Emperor. Do not forget God.' His Majesty should remember that in thinking of him we think of God, for is he not the almighty instrument in the glorious fight for Right?"

And so further deductions become inevitable. Just as there was once one law for the Jews and another for the Gentiles, so it has gradually begun to be seriously maintained that there is one law for the cultured German and another for the foreign barbarian. Christ came to break down the party wall between a chosen people and the rest of the world. If Germany had her way, she would re-establish a similar barrier between German and non-German, with one code for herself and another for dealing with her

neighbour. In fact, in this war she has already done so.

This is probably the subconscious motive that has produced her flagrant disregard for international law, as seen in the violation of Belgium (a crime obviously premeditated for years), in her abominable treatment of ambassadors and consuls (a terribly retrograde step), in her wholesale violation of the Hague Conventions (to which she had given her plighted word), in the Belgian atrocities (which have certainly outdone those of any civilized war during the last hundred years), in the burning of Louvain (the worst piece of vandalism for two hundred years), and finally in her cynical description of the treaty with Belgium as "a scrap of paper." Surely we have here materialism naked and unashamed. As has finely been said by *Truth*, by the same reckoning a word of honour is but an emission of breath, and the Ten Commandments only two blocks of stone.

Realpolitik is really, as the *Times* has pointed out, the doctrine of self-interest applied to a nation instead of to an individual. It is a form of Nietzscheism with all the fine things left out, especially the chivalry and generosity. M. Boutroux recently told the

writer that he was lecturing two years ago at Mulhouse on the text that in Old French the opposite of *barbarism* was not *civilization*, but *politesse* (the Germans may have the former, but certainly not the latter). At the close of his lecture an Alsatian came up and said, "Sir, could you tell me the German for *générosité?*" "Well," said M. Boutroux, "if you don't know, who know the language, how should I know?" The writer, when recently in Germany, had a conversation with one of the largest employers of labour in the country, employing no less than 35,000 persons. This national magnate, who was evidently on the most intimate terms with the Kaiser, was loud on the blessings of an alliance between England, Germany, and the United States against the other "barbarians." I could not help interjecting, "Are the French barbarians?"

CHAPTER III

OUR ALLIES AND OUR DUTIES

It seems here suitable to say a few words about our allies. To take Russia first. In view of the distrust with which Russia has been regarded in the past, it is well to utter a word of warning. Russia is still largely for the majority of English people a *terra incognita*. Much of our knowledge of her has also come through German sources, and in the light of the relations between Germany and Russia, we may well be careful to weigh, and if necessary to discount, anything we hear to the discredit of our gallant ally. A perusal of Tolstoy's *Peace and War*, of Dostoievski's *Crime and Punishment*, of Gorki's *Lowest Depths*, and of some of the writings of Stephen Graham would be suitable reading for those who have so little inkling of the grandeur of the Russian soul. We are still prone, though happily less than the Germans,

to measure up other civilizations by the standards of values we have established for our own. To the spiritual side of Russia this is a Holy War, that has given to all parties in the State a common denominator to fight for. Even the millions of Russian Jews have thrown in their lot with the rest. Russia has been spoken of for years as being on the brink of economic ruin, and yet it is probable that, owing to a series of splendid harvests, her economic condition has never been better. Like ourselves, she has had a comparatively recent experience in war, which nothing can replace. Those of her men who went through the Japanese War have learned the precious lessons of how to take cover and shift for themselves. Her plan of campaign appears to be fairly simple: first to clear the flanks, and then to advance along the whole line, while aiming specially at Berlin. Her strength, as we know, lies in her immense army, estimated at eight or nine millions. In one county at least of England, the Russian steam-roller has become legendary. Said one Norfolk yokel to another, no doubt with the recent improvements in road-making in his eye: "Du you know them there Russians ha' got a steam-roller?

They ha' got to come right across a lot of bog and marshes, so they ha' to make the road as they come along. Then the whole Russian army foller. That must be a masterpiece of a steam-roller. They call it the Heavy Launch. No doubt that must be a wonniful heavy machine."

Another point to note about the Russians, is their marching capacity—Napoleon said they could march round any soldiers in Europe. They can also support a higher percentage of losses than the troops of most nations without giving ground, as may be seen from the bloody records of Eylau, Friedland, and the battles before Moscow. And lastly, as Moltke significantly suggested, they begin too late and keep on too long. On this occasion, they appear to be well up with their time-table, or, at least, more so than the Germans had expected.

France. For the last forty years, the French have made a heroic effort to rebuild the nation by means of education, influenced no doubt by the success that attended the efforts of the Russian schoolmaster after Jéna. But while the school has done much to raise the morale of the nation, it is equally certain that the bicycle, the motor-car, and

especially the aeroplane, together with their sports in general, have been of priceless value in renewing the confidence of the French in themselves.

The history of their attitude towards Alsace-Lorraine is a curious one. When the writer first went to France in 1890, the general feeling towards Alsace-Lorraine appeared to be that of resignation. To the majority of French people Alsace-Lorraine was little more than a pious memory, one, it is true, not likely to fade soon from their minds, for the French have the immemorial memory of the Irish. But there did not seem to be much chance of the *revanche*. The Germans had sent a good many colonists into Alsace, they had conciliated the people to a certain extent by the building of Strasburg University and by other liberal measures. Moreover, the greater number of the Alsatians were *Auto-nomisten*, that is, people who declared were not pro-German or pro-French, but they wished to be made into an autonomist State like Belgium or Holland. Later, however, they began to see, as the Mailed Fist gradually revealed itself, that the future of small States was not well assured with reference to Germany. Moreover, the im-

possibility of a free Alsace forming part of a military-ridden Germany became more patent. German regulations became more severe. The people became more and more anti-German. Many of the children of the German settlers grew up more pro-French than the Alsatians themselves, and the affair of Zabern, when the whole town was bullied by the military for days and some of the chief civil officials arrested at sight and placed in the cells, was not only a revelation of feeling and of existing conditions, but very possibly ended for ever the chance of any permanent reconciliation between Germany and Alsace, and strengthened the pro-French feelings already strong in the country.

The two crises of Algeciras and Agadir had an extraordinary effect on the French peasant; he is not by nature a man of war, but having a stake in the country he is anxious to be left alone as far as possible. But under the influence of the two crises, especially the second, he became a changed man. From all quarters of France came the same report: If we are going to be bullied like this every two years or less, *faut en finir* ("let's have done with it"); and there is little doubt that had there been a different Ministry at the

helm in the September of the year of Agadir, France would have gone to war with Germany. One feels profoundly thankful now that she did not!

The same spirit still animates the French peasant to-day, and, so far as one can judge from many letters received from France, the whole French people. One peculiarly acute critic writes: "The simplest peasant has only one idea, that we may have done with bloated armaments and the terrors of armed peace. What France sees to-day, Europe not infrequently sees to-morrow!"

It seems difficult to believe that we shall be worsted, because we are fighting for the right, and right (*pace* our German friends) is might —but only when those who fight for it fight as manfully and as mightily as they can.

We may feel hopefully confident that the Germans will ultimately be driven back on the Rhine. Perhaps they will already be there when this appears in print. But there will then be serious difficulties.

Rivers to-day are far from easy to cross, as we learned to our cost in South Africa. The Austrians have had a similar experience on the Danube before Belgrade, which they have not yet succeeded in crossing. It is true the

Servians have since been more successful. They have also crossed the Save, but one imagines the Rhine will be better guarded. We may by that time be thinking of an invasion through Holland or Denmark; or if they are not yet ripe to come into the struggle, we may even make a descent on the German coast near Wilhelmshaven or elsewhere. Sooner or later Roumania will probably invade Hungary; and Bohemia may come into insurrection, if Austria is not by then humbled. Servia has already invaded Hungary, and Italy may not much longer refrain from invading the Trentino and Trieste.

All this may happen if things go smoothly for us. But in war it is wise to consider every alternative, even the most improbable.

If, after all, Germany should win, she would certainly annex Belgium, Holland, and possibly Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. She would certainly make France pay her the uttermost farthing by way of compensation, with a view to building a fleet more powerful than our own. Our destruction would therefore be a mere matter of time. If Germany ever conquered this country, she would probably impose such a ransom, judging by her dealings with France past and prospective,

as to cripple our commerce and resources for ever.

And if, true to her mission to Germanize the world, she decided to experiment on conquered England, then every Englishman, high or low, would suffer. One has only to look at the German record in Poland, in Schleswig, and in Alsace—perpetual domiciliary visits by the police, the most innocent social gatherings prohibited, be they village flower shows, gymnastic displays, or simple entertainments; wholesale expulsion of suspected persons from the country with no appeal, military brutalities of various kinds, and possible exclusion of the native tongue from the schools. Here is what a certain Professor Lonzius proposed amid the applause of professors and students as a suitable method for treating the Poles:

"All Polish societies should be suppressed without the slightest apology—as well as the societies of Alsace, Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein. . . . The people should be allowed only three privileges—to pay taxes, serve in the army, and shut their jaws."

I cannot imagine the feelings of an Englishman on seeing his children whipped for saying the Lord's Prayer in the vulgar tongue, as the

Polish children were at Wreschen, or one of our small county towns turned into a second Zabern, where officers go shopping with four soldiers on the lookout lest any one should snigger, and lame cobblers are sabred at sight.

But this presupposes that we are likely to be supine in the present war, and all the omens to-day are happily against it. The nation has awakened to the fact that, as Mr. Churchill said, this war, which began as one of honour, is now for self-preservation. We are going to secure the million men that Lord Kitchener has asked for. Democracy has been true to its trust. It has shown the world that in a nation of freemen one can without compulsion raise an army of a million. Certainly we have had before us some inspiring examples; that of little Belgium putting its whole manhood into the field can never be forgotten. In France, we have seen bitter political foes like M. Guesde and M. Delcassé take part in the same Ministry formed to defend the country. We have seen a leader of anti-militarism like M. Gustave Hervié, who once stated that the proper place on which to plant the French flag was a dung-heap, going off as a volunteer

to take his place in the army. To-day, for the first time since 1870, France is indeed one people! Frenchmen, some of the most advanced thinkers and politicians in Europe, are fighting not merely for their country. They realize that Europe and European civilization is in danger.

Only the other day I received a typical letter from a Frenchman of very advanced views well known in England. He wrote:

"I am naturally, owing to my age, beyond any regular call to the colours; but I live in such a state of fever that if we suffer reverses I shall go and enlist. For then France and civilization will have need of every arm."

The appearance of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law on a common platform, the campaign up and down the country by members of every political colour, the splendid drawing together of all classes, all point to the determination of every Englishman to see this thing fought to a finish. We have so many excellent reasons for straining every nerve here and now. French and Belgian territory has to be cleared as speedily as possible of the invader, the unfortunate inhabitants reinstated, their homes, where necessary, rebuilt, their industries reinstituted, and, what is most

important, the land sown for the next year's harvest. Again, the sooner we can end the war, the less the toll of our sacrifices and sufferings and those of our allies. And lastly, when the time for settlement comes, having, as seems probable, taken our fair share of the war and a huge army in being, we shall be in a position to insist on a thoroughly righteous, democratic, and therefore lasting, settlement of the map of Europe.

Democracy must, in fact, have two watchwords in this great campaign—A FIGHT TO THE FINISH and NEVER AGAIN. We have got to put, if necessary, our last man into the field, and spend, if necessary, our last shilling in order to smash and pulverize Kaiserdom and all that it stands for in the world. Anything short of this, a truce or a patched-up peace in the mistaken idea of preventing the further effusion of blood, will mean merely a far more terrible "blood bath" and butchery later. Such a peace would be a European calamity. Let us talk and think of the blood of those who have died for us and with us, and decide that, come what may, it shall not have been shed in vain. Again, when we make peace we must have such an army, joined with our supreme navy,

that we shall be able to throw a powerful influence on the side of justice—retributive justice if you please, but not of retaliation, far less of spoliation. That can only lead to the nation that is weakened for the moment nursing its revenge and biding its time, till the occasion presents itself for recovering its lost property. And so the weary sequence of wars will go on interminably. No: we must stand for a settlement which by its very justice will in the long run make for peace even in the hearts of the conquered.

CHAPTER IV

THE SETTLEMENT

THE Germans have a proverb that one should not sell the bearskin before one has caught the bear. Still the possibilities of good and evil after the war are so tremendous, the need of a righteous and lasting peace so imperative, that it seems worth while to undertake the *rôle* of the prophet, although it has always been scheduled under the dangerous trades, in order to forecast what should and may possibly come to pass.

As one engaged in education, I have, in recent years, had one particular truth more and more impressed on me. The more you are able to show your pupil the real meaning, the true aim and object of what he is learning, the more keen he becomes to put his hand to the task before him, however arduous it may appear to be. One cannot help feeling that this principle should be applied to

modern democracy. The State has to-day taken every one into partnership. It should therefore take all as far as possible into its confidence. When men know the aims and objects, near or ultimate, for which they are fighting, they are far more likely to bear with fortitude and calmness any chance disasters and reverses by the way.

And the Government through Mr. Churchill has already given us an objective. We are to fight for the great and sound principle of nationality. There must be no more Alsace-Lorraines in Europe! We must follow the French system and give to the people of any country or province the right to decide with which nation they wish to go, unless they desire to remain independent of all. Thus if Alsace and Lorraine desire to become part and parcel of France, by all means let them become so. Similarly, the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein should be allowed to decide whether it wishes to be reunited to Denmark, or whether Schleswig alone or that part of it which is Danish in blood and language should be once more joined to the Danish kingdom. The Tsar also has already promised in the most solemn fashion to reconstitute Poland. Let us, when the settlement

comes, attempt to secure for the new State a satisfactory constitution, so that parts, such as West Prussia, which are really Teutonic may receive special treatment. Our good offices with Russia may possibly help to restore to something like its former autonomy the Duchy of Finland, while maintaining its close dynastic connection with the Russian throne, possibly on some scheme of federation. A remarkable article in the *Saturday Review* of August 22d on "A Reformed Europe" gives reasons for thinking that such a hope is no vain one, but that when the time arrives the plea for the liberation of Finland will not fall on deaf ears at the Russian Court. Transylvania may properly be given to Roumania and the Hungarians, and isolated colonies of Germans transplanted to Hungarian or German soil. If proper compensation were made, there is no doubt that those affected would gladly re-establish their homes and homesteads. The policy of plantation has been tried and has failed; that of transplantation may have a better fate. Italia Irridenta, consisting of the Trentino, Trieste, and the Dalmatian littoral, might be assigned to Italy, and with this territory, the duty of protecting Albania. A great southern Slav

State might be constituted out of Croatia, Servia, Bosnia, and Montenegro. If Turkey is foolish enough to join Germany, she should be chased out of Europe, and this would certainly be a blessing, as it would reduce the number of factors in the solution of the Balkan problem. It might also prove not to be a bad thing for the Mohammedan world if the Caliph became as purely a spiritual authority as the Pope.

All this obviously implies the destruction of Kaiserdom and the reduction of Germany to proper German frontiers, and the cutting down of Austria to German limits. Bohemia, with its population of three fifths Czechs and two fifths Germans, if rendered independent or made part of a revived German Confederacy, would probably manage to settle down, as Belgium has done in spite of its two different races and languages. The more recent acquisitions of Prussia, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and the like, should be given the option of returning to the position they held before annexation. Austria might be, as of old, a part of the new German Confederacy. Sooner or later Russia in Europe will be faced with the gigantic problem of becoming a federated empire.

Heligoland should be held to prevent Germany rebuilding her navy, or given to Denmark or Schleswig, to which it formerly belonged. The Kiel Canal should be internationalized. But if Prussia is to be lessened, Germany should as far as possible be kept intact. The problem will be to secure for her a constitution in which once and for all the people will have a voice in the government of the country. There is little doubt that after her bitter experience of centralized Prussian government, and the disasters this has brought on the country, she will naturally revert to some form of federalism. One can have no wish to diminish the spiritual influence of Germany in the world, the Germany of Goethe, Luther, and Kant. One hopes for a spiritual revival of Germany, the Germany of the days before Bismarck, free from the internal squabbles of those times, which were largely promoted by the self-seeking of Austria and Russia—a sort of United States of Germany, in fact. That other Germany, one is convinced, is still alive, though buried for the moment under the weight of crass materialism. No doubt her reorganization may be long and bitter. She will, in all likelihood ere this comes to pass,

have to go through the ordeal of fire and sword which invasion necessarily implies—though for some parts, such as Bavaria and Würtemberg, the strain may be lessened through the acceptance of the Allies' terms, which Prussia from its very constitution will be the last to accept, for they must involve an entire transformation of the present *régime*. Such a policy would certainly facilitate the task of the Allies of dealing separately with Prussia. In any case, every section of Germany will have to contribute its quota towards the cost of the present war; though one hopes and trusts that in spite of her behaviour in France and Belgium she will not be called to endure the terrible retribution she has earned. As regards her colonies, they might rank as part of the assets used to pay the indemnity. *Above all we have got to insist on a drastic reduction of armies and navies all round.* We have for the last forty-four years tried the experiment of armed peace. It has proved a ghastly failure. It has not even saved the nations of Europe from the perpetual dread of war, almost as bad as war itself, and in the end it has failed to save us from war. It has hampered and delayed and injured the moral, social, and

political development of Europe. In this mad race for armaments, it is Germany who has throughout led the way and all the other nations have been obliged to follow suit. Kruppism has got to go. One cannot help feeling that, once the war is over, the people of Europe will have had such an object-lesson in the futility of this race for armaments, that they will at least be willing to attempt to settle their differences by arbitration.

But it will not be enough that individual nations may or may not be willing to submit to arbitration. We must go a step forward—we must create, foster, and develop, by education and other means, among the peoples themselves an international conscience so far as Europe if not the world is concerned, to ensure that if any disagreement arises between the individual nations, there will be a sufficient balance of neutral nations to see that arbitrations shall be compulsory and that henceforth international law shall not be left to the whim of any particular nation to observe or ignore. Let me explain.

During the nineteenth century, Liberals throughout Europe, rightly I think, fostered and developed the idea of nationality. The

result was the resurrection of Greece, the rise of Belgium, of Italy, the unification of Germany (there is no desire for a dismembered but for a constitutional Germany), and the progressive liberation of Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro.

Unfortunately, the Peace Societies throughout the world appear to have made an error in tactics. They have concentrated unduly on the idea of the *brotherhood of man* (cosmopolitanism) and have too often ignored the vital factor of nationality.

But surely the next logical step was, without neglecting the brotherhood of man, not to deny or decry nationality, as many did, but to recognize it as a definite step forward in civilization and to give up the major part of our energies to forwarding the gospel of the *brotherhood of nations*, or true Internationalism. But this can be realized only by a far stricter observance of international law than that now existing among the nations. Hitherto, *with certain exceptions, the relations of nations to one another have been those of brute beasts*. Until we have convinced the mass of the people in the majority of European countries that nations have their duty to the brotherhood or comity of nations just as cer-

tainly as individuals have their duty to a community of individuals, so long shall we have National Individualism run mad with its attendant evils of bloated armaments and its doctrine that might is right. In a word, we have got to make the peoples of the various nations *as sensitive to the reputation of their nation's good name as they are to its honour*. We must therefore at the conclusion of the war demand not only Home Rule all round for the nations, but also a far closer co-operation between them which lays down that self-aggrandizement within the United or Allied States of Europe shall cease. It may be well if we try to clear up our European difficulties as far so we can separately, while not excluding the rest of the world from the general principles of compulsory arbitration. And, secondly, we must insist that it is the primary duty of every nation, whether directly concerned or not, to help to keep the peace and see that the arbitration is duly carried out. The Americans are, in fact, beginning to see that in a war like the present, waged thousands of miles away, they cannot remain indifferent, because, apart from any material interests involved, it is their code of honour, their standard of morality, the prestige of

their most cherished institutions that is at stake.

Such a moral entente involves the establishment of a far stronger Hague Tribunal, a veritable Holy Alliance, but this time on democratic not autocratic lines, to compel nations to respect their international duties, responsibilities, and obligations.

The task is no easy one, but the terrible bloodshed and destruction that this war is going to cause, when nothing less than the civilization of Europe is at stake, will make the survivors, at the outset at least, if a righteous and not a vindictive peace be imposed, more ready to accept any policy likely to prevent the recurrence of a similar catastrophe. They will do this all the more readily once they realize there is no other way of escape from cut-throat competition in armaments and Kruppism in general, and from that ultimate relapse into moral and physical barbarism which inevitably awaits the continent of Europe in the long run if she cannot escape from the vicious circle in which the top dog of Europe has to be pulled down periodically by the rest of the pack.

I have faith none the less, after no doubt many vicissitudes of doubt and difficulty, and

even of despondency and perhaps despair, that the idea will, in spite of inevitable checks and reactions, ever gain further and further ground after each preceding reaction, and that in the end The Hague Tribunal will be the Delphic Oracle of a new Europe within which at least the nations will no longer be strangers and aliens, much less enemies to one another. One may hope that the great Republic of the West, if not a member of the European Concert, will none the less throw its weight on the side of peace and equity, and one may have little doubt on which side its vote and influence will ultimately be cast. The more deliberate the action of the States under President Wilson, the more impressive its final verdict will be.

That America is coming our way seems already beyond all doubt. Here are extracts from two personal letters from very prominent people in New York and New England. They are typical of scores of others from the same country.

"I cannot begin to tell you how distressed I have been over the horrible war. It seems as though we have gotten back to the times of the Huns led by Attila the 'scourge of God.' In spite of our nearness to the

Germans in very many ways (I am personally very much nearer the German people than the English people), the overwhelming sentiment of all of us is against the Kaiser, and we hope that what he stands for will receive a crushing blow, from which it will never recover, and that it may result in an end of wars. Perhaps this is too much to hope. It is, however, our ideal."

"I merely want to say how much I sympathize with you in the great contest into which England has been drawn against her will by the aggressions of Germany, and I sincerely hope that Europe will be able to stop once and for all the arrogant impudence of the Germans. If there ever was an act of aggression it was the notice that Germany served on Belgium that she proposed to use that country for a highway to France. Every man that I have talked with in this country is strongly anti-German. With the exception of a belt through Ohio, I am of the impression that the sentiment in this country is all on your side."

And one feels confident that the vast majority of women of this country and elsewhere will throw their weight in favour of such a tribunal. To them war is the most

terrible of all ordeals. To many (though happily it seems unlikely to be the case in this war, as far as we are concerned) it means the loss of the bread-winner. For wives and sweethearts, and especially for mothers, it often means the end of all they have lived for. Moreover, they recognize instinctively that nothing throws back their hopes and aspirations like war and the memory of war. Even the Suffragettes have recognized this and have, for the moment, put their special cause to one side. From one point of view, Germany is an example of a State almost exclusively man-made. The German wives and mothers are among the finest in the world, but their influence until recently has almost entirely been confined to children, kitchen, and church, to quote the Kaiser's phrase. They have been unduly subordinated to the men, so that the especially female and Christian virtues have not had their proper place on the official list. Their task has been to prepare the raw material—and all who are familiar with the virtues of the German's home know how splendid is that material. It is the *men in control of the machine* who mould it in the school, the army, and by a thousand other subtle means, and

naturally they exaggerate its masculine, one had almost written its brutal, tendencies. It is not for nothing that Bismarck spoke of the German as a male nation. Germany, to use Nietzsche's phrase, will have to inaugurate a transvaluation of its present values, but not altogether in the direction that Nietzsche imagined desirable.

Women, no doubt, are going everywhere to count much more in the economy of the world, unless we are doomed by the horrors of the present war and the awful exhaustion it may entail to a sort of European twilight. If we win in this war, *the peace of the world for the next hundred years will largely rest with the women.*

We are fighting more immediately, as Lord Rosebery has said, (1) to protect the French coasts from being ravaged in return for France policing the Mediterranean and keeping the road open to India; (2) to uphold the neutrality of Belgium.

These are solid reasons, but at bottom they are the indications of far wider issues:

(1) We are fighting for national existence.

(2) We are fighting for the ideas of liberty, democracy, free speech, self-government, against a mediæval feudalism in which god-

less science has taken the place of religion. In a word, we are fighting to put down Kaiserdom once for all. A victorious Germany would mean universal autocracy, or, as a German professor has put it, "The world would be saved by being Germanized! Re-made in Germany!"

(3) We are fighting for the recognition of international duties and international law by the nations, and so incidentally for the establishment of an International Court of Appeal for the nations of Europe in the shape of a strong Hague Tribunal.

(4) We are fighting for all that is best in Western civilization and in Western morality.

We are fighting not only for our own souls but for the soul of Germany as well.

This is really a struggle in its deepest sense between the old mechanistic ideas that dominated the latter half of the nineteenth century, based on mathematics and mechanical conceptions, and the new biological ideals, the reincarnation of far older ones, that are only just making their force felt in the world of thought through the influence of such forerunners as Bergson, Geddes, and others. That is to say, European philosophy has until recently been unduly dominated

by the material and physical sciences, and popular thought has naturally been similarly affected. Even in England our conceptions, whether political, social, or religious, are still too much influenced by machine-made ideas, and by metaphors taken from mathematics or mechanics which have crystallized into catchwords and even dogmas. If in the past it was man made the machine, it is too often the case to-day that the machine is making or rather unmaking man. Much of this is due to our theories of political economy, which till recently left the human element out of the question, and regarded the science as merely one of money-grabbing. Not that there is not a distinct value in studying and appraising living things in mathematical and mechanical terms, but the danger becomes acute when the economist forgets that these are alive, and that above all this weighing and measuring there is a science and an art of life which in its broadest sense is called *religion*. We have not in this country lost touch to the same extent with the conception of life being an organic and living thing as has science-ridden Germany, which looks on men as machines. Here is what an American correspondent already

quoted says of an army corps that took five hours to pass him:

"But when all is said and done, they impress me not as human beings, who have weaknesses and virtues, likes and dislikes of their own; but rather as parts, more or less important, of a mighty and highly efficient machine, which is directed and controlled by a cold and calculating intelligence in far-away Berlin.

"That machine has about as much human element in it as a steam-roller, as a meat-chopper, as the death-chair at Sing-Sing. Its mission is to crush, pulverize, obliterate, destroy; and no considerations of civilization, or chivalry, or humanity will affect it."

The present struggle is at bottom really one between science and religion in a far wider sense than that of any particular creed or creeds, between the temporal and the spiritual power. It is the tree of knowledge against the tree of life, or, as has already been said elsewhere, the question whether science should become once more the handmaiden of religion, or religion become the bondswoman of science, which in its Germanic guise appears to some of us as little short of devilish. Germany represents at its highest

perfection science, or at least mathematical and mechanical science. German civilization, being as it were the last word in mechanical organization, tends, as we have seen, to consider itself the one perfect civilization of the world, the unique civilization, the only one that counts, and hence arises the necessary duty of Germany to impose it on the rest of the world. We, on the other hand, are fighting for the principle of live and let live, for the right for other types of civilization beside our own to exist; and we are doubtless right, for it would seem that the next great world reunion or synthesis of thought and possibly of religion is going to be, not one huge centralized civilization, as the Germans dream, but rather a federation of civilizations, involving very possibly a reunion of Eastern and Western thought. And so the bringing of Indian troops to Europe at the present time is a matter of the highest significance. It is an outward and visible sign of the tardy recognition by the West of the equality of the East in the material world, and as such it can hardly fail to have a far-reaching effect on the prestige of Eastern thought.

If ever the brotherhood of man is to come,

it must come not by ramming and cramming one set of ideals, be they British, German, French, Chinese, or Hottentot, down the throats of the rest of the world, but by the harmonious synthesis and incorporation of all that is best in the various civilizations past and present. That is the new world that the thinkers of to-day, like so many Columbuses, are groping after.

These considerations may to some seem far-fetched. Yet, if they are ever realized, they may one day change the face of the world, for one cannot help feeling that we are possibly at one of those great decisive moments in history, like that of the Persian defeat at Salamis, or the Renaissance, or the invasions of the barbarians, when the world takes a big leap forward or else staggers back exhausted. We in this island home of ours are all speaking of the sense of the dream in which we seem to be living. We cannot realize or we realize with difficulty the nightmare that at this moment is brooding over Europe. The destroying angel comes to us and silently marks here a house and there a house, but otherwise life seems to be going on much the same; but hardly a couple of hours from our shores his gigantic wings

darken the whole heavens with an eclipse of dread, foreboding, and horror. European nations are realizing far more vividly than we that the day of Armageddon is upon us.

Personally I cannot conceive how if we do our best we can possibly be beaten, but we are assuredly ready to do our best and nothing short of our best.

But if the impossible happen, if our allies are hopelessly defeated, if European civilization seems temporarily to be destroyed, if all the ideas of freedom and justice and self-government that our ancestors fought and bled for be beaten with the finest of our manhood into the dust, let us fight on; let us who are considered too old to fight go into the fighting line. Better a thousand times to die for freedom and for justice and for all that we hold most dear than to live on as slaves and bondsmen who have lost the right to think for themselves and direct their own lives.

The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church; and even if we are destined to perish, those ideas for which we die are immortal. Out of our very dust shall they spring and blossom. The triumph of barbarian ideals can only be a temporary eclipse. A State

founded on injustice must inevitably collapse under the weight of its own transgressions. Justice and right dealing must win their way in the end. What every man feels in his own heart to be the ultimate foundations of his own existence cannot be a delusion and a lie.

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